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Coincidence by design 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we develop an approach to coincidences as discursive activities. To 
illustrate the range of empirical questions that can be explored in the analysis of 
coincidence accounts, we examine one single written account, which was submitted to 
a website of a research project to investigate the statistical dimensions of coincidence 
experiences. Our analysis is broadly ethnomethodological in that we examine this 
single case to identify how structural and narrative components work to constitute the 
recognizably coincidental quality of the events so described. The analysis identifies a 
mirror structure that resembles chiasmus, a figurative device found in classical texts. 
The analysis also describes how the account is designed to address inferential matters 
related to the site to which it was submitted. In the discussion we reflect on the 
implications of this approach for other approaches to coincidence.  
 
 
Introduction 
We have three objectives in this paper. First, we establish the broader significance of 
studying coincidence accounts, especially in relation to their value as therapeutic tools 
in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, and in relation to the broader study of mystical 
experience. Second, we set out some methodological principles for the analysis of 
coincidence accounts. Finally, we illustrate our methodological approach via a single 
case analysis of an account of a meaningful coincidence.  
 
Coincidence experiences can be defined as the 'conjunction between inner and outer 
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states: between thoughts, feelings, and images in one's mind and features of events in 
one's environment' (Beitman, Celebi and Coleman 2009:1). They are invariably 
fascinating: they suggest that everyday life can be surprising, or indeed uncanny, 
apparently guided by mysterious or even spiritual forces. They can be meaningful for 
the people who experience them, sometimes profoundly so, and can inform decisions 
about significant life events, such as careers or relationships. It is important to be 
clear that when we use the term, ‘meaningful coincidence’, we are not referring to 
confluences of thought and events that, though pleasing, are no more than 
happenstance. Rather, we refer to moments that can be taken to suggest the universe 
has a vested interest in our affairs and intervenes to bring about specific 
consequences.  
 
The psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung reported one of the most well known instances 
of a meaningful coincidence (Jung, 1955). This concerned the appearance of a scarab 
beetle at his office window at the same moment that he was treating a patient who had 
just reported a dream involving a golden scarab. Jung identifies the clinical 
significance of this event: at the time, he had made little progress with this patient's 
case; however, the appearance of the scarab beetle at the time the patient reported her 
dream facilitated a significant therapeutic breakthrough. The coincidental event, 
therefore, was not just meaningful at the time it happened, but had an important role 
in the participants' subsequent relationship. Jung developed the concept of 
synchronicity to capture the paradox of meaningful yet ostensibly random conjunction 
of events.  In this paper we use the term ‘meaningful coincidence’ to include those 
events that, following Jung, would be viewed as synchronistic, and evidence of the 
operation of acausal connectivity. 
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Although the concept of synchronicity has bled into popular discourse, Jung's initial 
investigations did not lead to sustained research on coincidence experiences. Recently 
however, academics from a range of disciplines have begun to research meaningful 
coincidences, and to call for sustained interdisciplinary research on coincidence 
(Beitman, 2011; Hammond, 2007; Leong, Vetere and Howard, 2012). The most 
sustained interest in coincidence, however, has come from academics and 
practitioners in psychotherapy. To an extent, this reflects a long-standing interest in 
meaningful coincidences between analysts and patients that border on the paranormal 
or telepathic. Freud wrote six papers on curious intersections between patient and 
analyst, although some were unpublished (Silverman, 1988). It is widely recognized 
that contemporary relationships between therapists and patients or clients routinely 
exhibit meaningful coincidences (Roxburgh, Ridgway and Roe, 2016). Consequently, 
and following Jung, some therapists have addressed how these synchronistic events 
can be incorporated systematically into therapeutic practice, and in the process of 
healing more generally (Allick, 2003; Marlo and Kline, 1998; Nachman, 2009; 
DePeyer, 2016).  
 
A notable illustration of this is Beitman’s monograph on the psychology of 
meaningful coincidences (2016). While aimed at a lay audience, this book develops 
many of the themes initially explored in academic publications (for example, Beitman 
and Coleman, 2010; Beitman and Shaw, 2009). A key focus of his argument is the 
way that coincidence-sensitive people can learn to increase their awareness of 
coincidence in their lives, understand their implications for their life trajectories, 
decisions and opportunities, and exploit their coincidence experiences for self 
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actualization, personal understanding, spiritual growth and so on. Beitman is an 
established academic, having held senior university posts in psychiatry. His account 
of the therapeutic or personal benefits of coincidences is rooted in a serious 
therapeutic concern with the psychological dynamics of human experience.  
 
There is an ambiguity in Beitman’s approach in that, while he focuses on the practical 
personal benefits from taking account of one’s experience of coincidences, he does 
not deny that they may appear to be evidence of the operation of more mystical or 
paranormal agencies. Other psychotherapists have been much more explicit in their 
acceptance of the ostensibly paranormal implications of coincidences that occur with 
their patients, especially in the field of relational psychoanalysis (for example Burton, 
2012; de Payer, 2016). It is clear that they can be taken to represent the play of a 
transcendent force in human affairs. As such, the examination of reports of 
coincidences can contribute to the study of more overtly spiritual or religious 
experience: they both entail a private subjective dimension, suggest the influence of 
unseen and perhaps transcendent forces, and the experiences may be deeply 
meaningful for those who have them.  
 
There are significant methodological difficulties in trying to understand religious or 
spiritual experience. As Yamane wrote, social scientists ‘cannot empirically study 
experiencing, thus understood, for it is a wholly private, individual affair inaccessible 
to any currently known methods of social scientific research’ (2000:173). We are 
forced to rely on people’s accounts of their experiences. Yamane agues that it is 
necessary to study what he calls the ‘the intersubjective articulation of experience’ 
(2000: 174), and calls for a broadly narrative approach to experience. This is a 
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position echoed more recently by Gokel, who explores how the tools of narrative 
analysis can expose levels of meaning of reports of religious experience (Gokel, 2013; 
see also the range of methodological responses explored in transpersonal psychology, 
for example, Braud and Anderson, 1998; Anderson and Braud, 2011).  Reports of 
coincidences also invite qualitative and interpretive analysis of the meaning of the 
experience. However, prior to the application of what James has called the analytic 
imagination to reveal the meanings of peoples’ accounts, (James, 2013), there is 
perhaps a more foundational set of empirical issues that need to be explored. 
 
The analysis of accounts in social science has a long history (for example, Burke, 
1945; Lyman and Scott, 1970). A common theme is the assumption that accounts can 
be examined to reveal more or less objective features of the world ‘out there’, or 
internal mental or cognitive processes. Discourse is taken to be an essentially 
representational medium. This view of accounts (and qualitative data more generally) 
has resulted in empirical work in which the goal of analysis is to identify broad 
themes in people’s discourse, which are then taken to stand for objective features of 
their experiences or thoughts (for an example of this kind of research with respect to 
coincidences, see Roxburgh, Ridgway and Roe, 2015).  
 
The representational view of language has been challenged by social scientists 
influenced by rhetoric, the later Wittgenstein, ethnomethodology and conversation 
analysis (Augoustinos and Tileaga, 2012; Edwards, 1997; Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; 
Pollner 1987; Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Although theoretically and 
methodologically heterogeneous, a common assumption of this tradition is that 
accounts (both in the narrow technical sense, and the broader sense of narratives) are 
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examined as socially constituted and dynamic objects, the composition of which is 
underpinned by tacit norms and taken for granted cultural knowledge, and which 
perform interactional or inferential tasks in and for the settings in which they are 
produced. It is this view of the constructive and constitutive properties of talk and 
texts that sets our approach apart from, for example, most forms of narrative analysis, 
which are informed by more representational views of language and meaning (for 
example, Murray, 2003).  
 
Our primary influence is Smith's (1978) single case analysis of a student's written 
account of the way that an interviewee’s acquaintance began to display symptoms of 
mental illness. Smith examined the account to see how its structural organisation 
reflected culturally available but tacit assumptions about what constitutes noticeable 
departures from 'normal' behaviour. Her analysis identified how norms about mental 
illness informed the organisation of the account of a person's behaviour such that it 
came to be heard and read as a legitimate (that is, reasonable, factual or unmotivated) 
account of objectively real mental ill health. Her analysis showed that the fabric of 
mental illness as an objective state was taken to be isomorphic with the everyday 
descriptive practices for warrantable reporting of mental illness. Following Smith’s 
approach, we examine a coincidence report to identify how socially organized 
descriptive components of the narrative work pragmatically and rhetorically to 
formulate a particular sense for the events in the world to which they refer. We focus 
first on the structural organization of the account, and then investigate specific 
descriptions that exhibit the author’s tacit understanding of what constitutes for this 
website, a meaningful coincidence. 
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Methodology: the single case analysis 
The use of a single case analysis has a long history in many forms of qualitative 
research, but it has particular relevance in the development of conversation analytic 
studies of ordinary verbal interaction. Often, studies of single cases are motivated by 
distinctive features of the interaction, or their consequences in the world beyond the 
talk (for example, Whalen, Zimmerman and Whalen, 1988). Not all single case 
analyses are motivated by the inherent public interest in the fragment of interaction 
being studied, or its wider consequences. For example, Schegloff has also used a 
single fragment of data to bring to light how various communicative competencies 
that intersect in any stretch of interaction. He describes this procedure as a 
“decomposition” exercise (Schegloff, 1987:101) whereby the resources of previous 
analytic work on a range of discourse phenomena are brought to bear on a single data 
fragment. (For other examples of single case analysis in this tradition, see 
Mandelbaum, 1987; Schegloff, 1988a; Woods and Wooffitt, 2014; Wooffitt, 1988). 
Following Schegloff, the objective of our detailed examination of one case is to 
establish the orderly organisational properties of a fragment of naturally occurring 
discourse, while at the same time sketching lines of inquiry for subsequent research.  
 
Target data 
The coincidence account selected as the target for this single case analysis comes 
from Spiegelhalter’s Cambridge Coincidence project 
(http://understandinguncertainty.org/coincidences), to which members of the public 
are invited to submit written accounts of their own coincidence experiences. The 
selection of this specific account followed procedures common to conversation 
analytic data sessions, in which analysis is not motivated by any specific empirical 
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questions, but which focuses on data to see what empirical phenomena those data may 
yield. It was not, therefore, selected because of any special features. It was part of a 
pile of stories from the site, which had been printed out prior to empirical analysis. 
This account was selected for a data analysis session simply because it was on the top 
of the pile. Until it was selected in this random fashion, it had not been subject to any 
analytic attention.  
 
The account has been reproduced almost exactly as it was presented on the 
Cambridge Coincidence website. The only change is that the account has been 
numbered by line, including the title (provided by the author of the account), which is 
represented below as line 1. 
 
01 Two siblings, same chance encounter 
02 A little while ago I went to Amsterdam to visit my 
03 boyfriend. While there, we decided to rent some bikes 
04 and go cycle outside the city. On our way to the lake we 
05 were headed, my boyfriend got a flat tyre, so we started  
06 to walk in a little village on the hunt for a bike shop.  
07 It was while we were walking that we chanced upon a film  
08 set, where they were shooting a cough commercial. While  
09 my boyfriend was busy sorting out his bike issues, I 
10 approached one guy on set and started asking questions  
11 about the shoot. I mentioned that my brother was trying  
12 to get into the film industry, and asked about his 
13 experiences. He told me that he was going to be moving 
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14 to London soon, so I gave him my brother's details.  
15 Cue a month later, my brother was cycling to work in  
16 London when he chanced upon a film set. Eager to make  
17 contacts and find work, he decided to approach the team  
18 and start asking what they were filming. He then said he  
19 was trying to get into the industry and wanted to leave  
20 his details in case they needed someone. And when he  
21 said his name.... the guy he was talking to realised  
22 that he was the brother I had mentioned in our chance  
23 encounter not 4 weeks ago in Amsterdam! 
 
The gender of the author is not available from the website, but we make the wholly 
heteronormative assumption that she is female, and use female pronouns to refer to 
the author accordingly. 
 
Our analysis focuses on two issues: the structure of the narrative; and the way that it 
is designed to manage a tension between the personally meaningful dimensions of the 
events, and more rational, statistical explanation for ostensibly striking coincidences. 
 
Mirror formulations and narrative binding 
This coincidence account (like many coincidence accounts) is essentially a single 
story constructed around two discrete and ostensibly unrelated events; in this case, the 
author finding a film set outside Amsterdam, and a subsequent story about the 
author’s brother happening upon a film set in London. It is easy to imagine how these 
two stories could be portrayed not as a coincidence, but as the basis for shared 
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experience (‘and that happened to my brother too’) or shared objectives (‘we were 
both thinking how this might help his career’). Consequently, these two stories have 
to be produced so that they form constituent parts of the larger coincidence account. 
One method by which this narrative binding can be achieved is through the use of a 
form of structural mirroring in which specific formulations for events are repeated. 
 
There is the repeated use of ‘chanced’: the author reports that she 'chanced upon a 
film set' (lines 7-8); later she describes how her brother also 'chanced upon a film set' 
(line 16). It is first used to portray the happenstance manner in which the author 
encountered the film crew outside Amsterdam; it is subsequently used to depict the 
equally happenstance manner in which her brother subsequently encountered a film 
crew in London. There are other examples. Both segments of the story begin with a 
temporal location. The author’s story begins with ‘A little while ago’ (line 1); the 
brother’s segment begins with ‘Cue a month later’ (line 15). There are also initial 
geographical locations, by reference to Amsterdam and London (lines 1 and 16). She 
characterizes the bike trip outside the city as something she and her boyfriend 
‘decided’ to do (line 3); subsequently, when reporting her brother’s encounter with 
the film set in London, she reports that ‘he decided’ to approach a member of the 
crew (line 17).  Her encounter with the crew was as a consequence of going for a 
cycle ride in the country (lines 4-6); her brother’s encounter with the film crew was 
while he was cycling to work (line 15). In her conversation with the member of the 
film crew she reports that her brother ‘was trying to get into the film industry’ (lines 
12-13); later she reports that her brother told the member of the crew he was talking 
to that he ‘was trying to get into the industry’ (line 19). The author ‘started asking’ 
questions of the film crew (line 10), and her brother subsequently ‘starts[s] asking’ 
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questions of the member of the set he approaches. The author reports that she 
‘gave…my brother's details’ to her co interlocutor (lines 13-14); later the brother is 
described as wanting to ‘leave his details in case they needed someone’ with a 
member of the crew (lines 19-20). It is this last set of mirror formulations that segues 
the narrative to its denouement as a coincidence. 
 
These instances of mirroring are built out of the same words or variations of the same 
words; but the same mirroring effect can be achieved through more thematic parallels, 
for example, the reference to time. In one sense time, or the temporal ordering and 
sequentiality of events, is ubiquitous in this (and other) narratives, in that any reported 
activity takes place at some time in the past, or is explicitly or implicitly depicted as 
being contingent on a prior or future event. While these implicit temporal 
underpinnings merit investigation to explore how they work to ensure the account is 
produced as a recognizable coincidence account, we are here more interested in the 
explicit references to time.  There are three: 
 
‘A little while ago‘ (line l1) 
‘Cue a month later’ (line 15) 
‘not 4 weeks ago’ (line 23) 
 
The first two each preface a discrete story segment, and as such are an example of 
narrative mirroring. The third comes at the denouement of the story.  It is an 
alternative formulation of the period described in ‘cue a month later’. Each reference 
to time displays the author’s tacit orientation to the specific design requirements of 
this coincidence story. ‘A little while ago’ and ‘Cue a month later’ reflect two very 
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different ways to reference time in narrative. The first is a formulation of time that is 
designed as an omni relevant formulation, in that it is unspecific, and anyone can 
identify with it: that is, the events to be recounted are ‘a little while ago’ for both 
author and reader. It is a formulation that also signals that the precise date of the event 
is, for the purposes of this account, of no relevance. The second temporal formulation, 
‘a month later’ operates to a different set of criteria: it is relevant in relation to the 
story; so while there is no objective identification of time (for example in terms of 
year or month) it is inferably a month later from that point in time previously 
identified as ‘a little while ago’. This is a local temporal formulation in that its 
relevance derives from the internal structure of the narrative. The relative specificity 
of the time period so described (in relation to the omni relevant imprecision of ‘a little 
while ago’) inferably anticipates a key event for the narrative, a foreshadowing that is 
explicitly underpinned by the use of ‘Cue’ to highlight the apposite relation between 
events just reported and events to be reported.  
 
Although reference to a month later is specific relative to ‘a little while ago’ it retains 
a degree of ambiguity. Because a month varies between 28 and 31 days, it can be used 
as an approximation of a length of time. Equally, it can be used to mark the change 
from one calendar month to the next. This ambiguity is subsequently exploited in the 
final temporal reference. In the internal logic of the story, ‘not 4 weeks ago’ is an 
alternative formulation of ‘a month later’, in that it also captures the length of time 
that passed between the author’s meeting with the film crew and her brother’s 
encounter. However, the latter formulation establishes that the time between the two 
events is notably short, and therefore significant; the negative formulation ‘not even’ 
emphasises the remarkable nature of the brother’s meeting. 
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In her analysis of an account of a young woman’s apparent slide to mental illness, 
Smith (1978) noted that structural organization of the narrative provided for particular 
kinds of interpretations. For example, the implied contrast between ‘normal 
behaviour’ and what the young woman did facilitated the interpretation that her 
actions were not those of a ‘normal’ (that is, mentally healthy) person. Consequently 
the structural organization of the narrative indexed and made relevant ‘common 
sense’ understandings in such a way that tacit attributions of mental instability were 
more likely to be facilitated. The structural mirroring here similarly attends to a range 
of inferential work, in that it reinforces the symmetry of events that underpinned the 
coincidental event; that is, the way that the brother ended up talking to the same 
person with whom his sister had earlier discussed her brother’s career ambitions. The 
symmetry of these events is reflected in the various structural and lexical symmetries 
around which this story is built. Collectively they discursively embody precisely the 
curious synchrony of events and that constitute this story as a story of a meaningful 
coincidence. 
 
Chiastic properties of the mirror structure 
In this section we wish to make some remarks on features of the broader organisation 
of the account. In a study of the organisation of introspection in psychological 
experiments, it has been noted that how reports of inner experience (thoughts, 
imagery, and so on), exhibited features that resembled classic figures of speech. For 
example, reports of discrete conscious experiences might be initiated and completed 
by words or phrases in which the same sounds were prominent. This resembles the 
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phenomenon of epanalepsis in poetry, in which a word or clause occurs at the 
beginning and end of a line (Author and Other, 2011).  
 
Of the various figurative devices to be found in the introspective data, perhaps the 
most intriguing were cases of apparent chiasmus. In this figurative device sounds, 
letters, words, phrases or ideas are reversed to make a broader point. (The term 
chiasmus derives from a Greek word chiazein, meaning 'to mark with or in the shape 
of a cross'.) Everyday examples of chiasmus would be well known sayings such as 
‘It’s not the men in my life, but the life in my men’, and ‘Ask not what your country 
can do for you, but what you can do for your country’, where the latter part of the 
phrase or sentence repeats many of the features from the first part, but in reverse 
order. In his lectures on everyday poetics in conversational interaction, Harvey Sacks 
noted a similar phenomenon, which he called reversals, in which particular sound or 
word sequences seem to be conspicuously inverted to achieve a form of acoustic 
mirroring (Sacks, 1992, vol. II: 308).  
 
Examples of chiasmus1 are usually investigated in formal, written texts. It occurs in 
Homeric Greek and in Latin in the works of Roman authors (Welch, 1981a). It has 
been found in the plays of Shakespeare (Davis, 2003), nursery rhymes (Welch, 
1981b), the rhetoric of advertising (McQuarrie and Mick, 1996). It is commonly 
associated with the analysis of religious texts. Studies of chiasmus in classical literary 
and religious texts examine how ideas or themes may be reversed to achieve 
rhetorical ends.  This reversal may take complex forms. The following example 
comes from Welch's (1981c) study of chiasmus in the Book of Mormon, and 
illustrates how key narrative themes can be repeated and inverted. It is found in a 
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speech by Benjamin in which he tells the nation that they will be spiritually empty 
until 
 
‘They humble themselves and become as little children believing that 
salvation is in the atoning blood of Christ for the natural man, an enemy to 
God and has been from the fall of Adam and will be forever and ever unless 
he yieldeth to the Holy Spirit and putteth off the natural man and become a 
saint through the atonement of Christ and becometh as a child, submissive, 
meek and humble’  
 
The following representation of this speech exposes the various embedded reversals 
around which it is organized. 
 
[a]  They humble themselves 
 [b]  and become as little children 
  [c]  believing that salvation is in the atoning blood of Christ 
   [d]  for the natural man 
    [e]  is an enemy to God 
     [f]  and has been from the fall of Adam 
     [f]  and will be forever and ever 
    [e]  unless he yieldeth to the Holy Spirit 
   [d]  and putteth off the natural man 
  [c]  and become a saint through the atonement of Christ 
 [b]  and becometh as a child 
[a]  submissive, meek and humble  
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This illustrates various ways by which echoic but inverted relationships are 
established: the repeat of specific words and phrases ('humble'; 'natural man'), 
alternative references to the same thing ('God'/'Holy Spirit') and alternative or 
contrastive formulations (such as the reference to temporality in 'has been' and 'will 
be').   
 
Following this step, we can see that in the target data, the author’s coincidence 
account display broadly chiasmic properties.  
 
[a] A little while ago…Amsterdam [temporal marker + location] 
 [b] film set  
  [c] approached one guy…asking questions about the shoot.   
   [d] moving to London soon,   
    [e] my brother's details.  
    [e] my brother was cycling to work  
   [d] in London  
  [c] approach the team….start asking  
 [b] what they were filming  
[a] 4 weeks ago in Amsterdam [temporal marker + location] 
 
The second part of the narrative is not a perfect reversal of the first; there are themes 
or segments in one part that do not occur in the other. But there does seem to be 
sufficient thematic and topical reversal to warrant the claim of some form of chiasmic 
organization. The mirroring effect is achieved in references to key features of the 
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story: when and where it happened; events which subsequently take on significance 
(happening upon a film set); agency and action (approaching the set to ask questions); 
discovery of potentially relevant information (the anticipated relocation to London); 
and the introduction of a necessary character (the brother). Broadly, these key nodes 
of the story are repeated in reverse in the second part of the account. 
 
In the literature of classical studies, there has been discussion of the methodological 
difficulties in attempting to identify chiasmus over longer stretches of text (Welch, 
1981b: 13); and we recognize that the chiasmic features of this account are not as 
clear or as neat as they are in the more well known examples we described earlier. 
However, our analysis leads us to conclude that it is at least possible that this 
coincidence account has a chiastic structure.  
 
We should not be surprised that classical rhetorical forms can be discerned in 
something as mundane as an account of the experience of a coincidence. Person 
(2016) has demonstrated that many features of ostensibly formal classic texts reflect 
the properties of communicative practices discovered in conversation analytic work 
on talk-in-interaction, such as turn taking, sequence organisation and storytelling.  He 
argues that features found in classical texts are adaptations of everyday 
communicative competences. Of particular relevance to this paper is his examination 
of what is known as ring composition, in which the elements in classic narratives or 
stories are repeated in reversed form. He shows that this seemingly complex structure 
closely resembles the structures of stories told in mundane conversation. His work 
therefore provides support for the claim that the target account in this paper exhibits 
properties conventionally associated with classical texts. It also supports the argument 
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that what have usually been taken to be specialised or artful figurative devices may be 
generic, culturally available communicative resources.  
 
Managing motives and mystery 
In making a claim for striking coincidence, it is necessary to highlight those features 
of the story that make this particular set of discrete events more than simply two 
unrelated events that happen at the same time, or the same thing that happens to two 
different people, and so on. Moreover, a coincidence narrative loses its rhetorical 
power if the relation between discrete events is seen to be habitual or engineered in 
some way; that is, it’s not much of a coincidence that you bumped into your sister 
abroad if you knew she was planning to travel to that location, and you went there 
knowing she was there. The story must be produced so that the relation between 
events is remarkable, striking, and almost beyond belief.  
 
There are many popular texts and websites that provide examples of coincidences that 
suggest profoundly mystical or otherworldly agencies and forces operating on human 
affairs. Popular interest in the kinds of events is largely driven by their intrinsic 
mysteriousness. The Cambridge Coincidence project, however, has a different focus. 
According to the project website homepage, members of the public are invited to post 
their coincidence narratives to help identify the broad characteristics of coincidences, 
and to facilitate ‘scientific explanations which may account for them - whether by 
doing the maths to calculate the chances of a coincidence, or speculating on the weird 
and wonderful workings of our brains’. The primary academic interest in coincidence 
accounts is explicitly rational: that is, these accounts are not invited to allow 
investigation of uncanny or spiritual interventions; the objective is to identify either 
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the probabilistic frequencies of events presented as coincidences, or to allow 
reflection on the ways in which mundane cognitive processes can lead us to attribute 
the status of coincidence to otherwise unremarkable events. There is, then, a tension: 
stories that conventionally lend themselves to mystical or paranormal explanations are 
recruited for a research project seeking to investigate rational and non-paranormal 
explanations.  
 
There are various ways in which this tension is managed in the target data. The author 
has titled her account, 'Two siblings, same chance encounter'. The word 'chance' is 
also used in the final sentence of the story, the dénouement in which it becomes 
explicit that something conspicuously meaningful has happened. 'Chanced upon' 
seems curiously artful (if not slightly old fashioned); moreover, it has a reflexive 
quality, in that its repeated use is fitted to, and constitutes, its status as an account of a 
coincidental happening. But it may also be the case that the use of the word chance to 
title the story, and in the actual narrative, reflects the author's tacit (or perhaps 
explicit) appreciation of the website to which it is being posted, and, presumably, for 
which it was written. The use of the word 'chance' in this story works in two ways. 
First, 'chance' invokes probabilistic reasoning, and therefore explicitly acknowledges 
the site's origins in research on statistics and event frequency. Second, it is an explicit 
claim that the story is recognised by the author as one that could be attributed to 
happenstance, and may not be evidence that human affairs are ordered by supra 
normal or mystical forces. It is designed to fit with the rational or sceptical account of 
coincidences that might be associated with knowledge of statistical probabilities. An 
analogy could be made to the notion of recipient design in conversation analytic 
studies of talk-in-interaction: in the same way that an utterance will be designed with 
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respect to the intended recipient, so too has this account been produced with an 
orientation to the kind of site to which it was submitted.   
 
Consider also the use of ‘decided’ to capture both the author’s cycle ride that led to 
the meeting with the film crew, and her brother’s rationale for approaching the crew 
on the set he encountered. As Schegloff (1988b:124) has observed, a course of action 
that is formulated as having been ‘decided’ upon is produced to be heard as an 
intentionally achieved outcome. In this case, each use of ‘decided’ reports intended 
actions that ultimately led to the coincidence happening. They propose a motive for 
the actions of the author and her brother. In the first case, it is perfectly normal to 
decide to hire bikes on a holiday; in the second, it is understandable that a person with 
a career interest in the film industry might decide to talk to someone already in that 
line of work. These are mundane motives, and work to show that the actor’s actions 
that led to the coincidence were not motivated by an interest in seeking or finding a 
striking synchronicity.  
 
This is significant: studies of discourse in which people are reporting what might be 
termed unusual experiences have found that people do pragmatic work to show that 
they have no prior motivations or interest in the experience they report. For example, 
in his study of accounts of paranormal experiences, Wooffitt observed that people 
routinely do not use commonly available terms (such as ‘out of body experience’, 
‘UFO’, and so on). He argued that not naming a phenomenon has inferential function. 
Being able to name a state of affairs or an object implies having knowledge about 
them. Moreover, being able to name some anomalous experience suggests a 
commitment to the in-principle existence of the object so named, and can be taken as 
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an indication of interest in the phenomenon. This might then be the basis for sceptical 
reassessment, for example, that the person wanted to have this experience, and was 
therefore inclined to misperception of an ordinary event (Wooffitt, 1992; Woods and 
Wooffitt, 2014). Other studies have also described rhetorical practices by which 
claims of unusual or paranormal experiences are established as robust, objective, 
factual and authoritative (Childs and Murray, 2010;Hayward, Wooffitt and Woods, 
2015; Williams and Dutton, 1998; Wooffitt, 2006). 
 
With respect to the coincidence account, the use of ‘decided’ then, performs two 
interpretive actions. It normalises the actors’ motives in the story; their actions that 
led to the coincidence were quite mundane (Wooffitt, 1991). This reflects the 
overarching rationalist orientation of the website. However, it also reinforces the 
sense that something genuinely unusual occurred. The author and her brother were not 
seeking a striking coincidence, but were merely caught up in events the agency of 
which was not reducible to the relevant participants. 
 
There is, clearly, an alternative formulation for this story which works to undermine 
its claim as a striking coincidence: that the sister told her brother of her meeting 
outside Amsterdam, and that she had mentioned him and his interests to a member of 
the film crew, who would be in London – where, it transpires, her brother lives - in 
the coming weeks. In this way, the brother’s encounter with the same person is 
predisposed: he has a motive to seek out a film crew, knowing that his sister has 
already facilitated the possibility of an introduction into the industry he wishes to 
work in. The hint of this alternative formulation provided for by tacit knowledge 
associated with Membership Categorization Devices (Hester and Eglin, 1997; 
 23 
Housley and Smith, 2011); in this case, the familial category pair of brother/sister. 
People in this relationship would be expected to be aware of the other’s interests or 
ambitions, and disposed to help them realize those ambitions if the opportunity arose. 
The story could be recast, then, not as striking coincidence, but as a likely outcome 
given what is conventionally known about sibling relationships. There are various 
ways in which the account is produced so as to circumscribe this alternative reading 
of the account, and preserve the ostensible mystery. 
 
In her account, the author describes how she approached ‘one guy on set’; her brother 
is subsequently reported to ‘approach the team’.  While these separate episodes work 
to sustain the overarching mirroring between the two story segments, the subtle 
differences work rhetorically, in that they point to the management of alternative 
formulations that would undercut the claim of a striking coincidence. As becomes 
apparent, the person the narrator’s brother approaches turns out to be the same ‘guy’ 
that the narrator had talked to in Amsterdam. At the time of writing this report for 
submission to the Cambridge Coincidence website, however, the author is obviously 
aware of this fact – it is the basic feature of the story that makes it relevant for 
submission to the website in the first place. In this light, it is notable that the author 
describes her brother as approaching ‘the team’ and not a specific individual. This 
reinforces the coincidental quality of the account in two ways. First, in approaching 
the team – an unspecified number of people, but inferably greater than one – she 
emphasizes the striking fact that the person he ends up approaching just happens to be 
the same person to whom she spoke. Second, portraying her brother to have 
approached the team recognizes and addresses the possibility that the brother might 
have targeted a specific person on the set as a direct consequence of hearing of his 
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sister’s earlier encounter with the ‘one guy’ while visiting her boyfriend. 
 
There are other moments in which the design of the story works to manage what 
might be delicate inferential landscapes. For example, there is a difference between 
the way the author formulates her motives for her actions, and her brother’s motives. 
Her account suggests that she only approached the film crew because her boyfriend 
was preoccupied with repairs to his bike. Moreover, while conversing with a member 
of the crew, she ‘mentions’ her brother’s career interests in the film industry. These 
two features of the narrative work to establish that her brother’s career aspirations 
were not the motive for approaching the film set in the first instance. This contrast 
with the way that her brother’s encounter with the film set in London is described. 
Whereas she is portrayed as incidentally approaching the film crew, he is reported as 
‘deciding’ to initiate conversation; and where as she mentions his interests, he is 
reported as explicitly raising his career ambitions: ‘he then said he was trying to get 
into the industry’ (lines 18 – 19). 
 
Finally, the author’s report of her encounter with the film crew is clearly crucial in the 
narrative: if she did not talk to that specific individual, there is no coincidence to 
report. That event, however, is not just pivotal; it is also vulnerable, in that it can be 
recast as the outcome of her intention to help her sibling, which in turn makes the 
eventual outcome less striking as an example of a coincidence. There are various 
ways in which her production of her encounter anticipates and counters the less 
mysterious formulation of events. So, in line 3, the author reports that she and her 
boyfriend rented 'some' bikes. 'Some' is a strange way to report a number of bikes 
used by two people. While the use of 'some' here is conspicuous when viewed 
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logically, it works as a form of stake management (Potter, 1996): the contrived 
vagueness implies that the author was uninterested in precisely those events that led to 
the encounter with the film crew. The unanticipated (and inferably unsought after) 
contingency of just happening upon a film crew is further reinforced by reference to 
her boyfriend. That is, his preoccupation with the repair to his bike is explicitly raised 
just after the point where she has announced finding the film set, and just before she 
reports approaching one person on the set. The author’s approach to the film crew is 
thus presented as opportunistic: it was not pre-planned, or motivated by her 
knowledge of her brother’s career aspirations, but a way of filling the time while the 
boyfriend attended to his bike. Moreover, the warrant for this opportunistic action is 
inserted immediately prior to that episode of her story which is crucial to its 
subsequent unfolding as a report of a striking coincidence. 
 
Conversation analytic studies of talk-in-interaction have demonstrated that ‘[s]tories 
told in conversation are not fixed recitations of a narrative’ (Lerner, 1992: 268). They 
are interactionally produced, embedded in and emerging from particular sequential 
contexts, and designed in various delicate ways for the recipient(s) and in relation to 
the teller’s understanding the recipients’ anticipated stance and relevant knowledge 
(Goodwin, 1987; Jefferson, 19788; Sacks, 1992). They are designed for recipients. 
The design of a story may also reflect the teller’s tacit inferences about wider cultural 
conventions. For example, Wooffitt’s analysis of reports of paranormal experiences 
shows that accounts are routinely designed to address potential sceptical explanations 
of claimed paranormal experiences (Wooffitt, 1992). The target data for this analysis 
exhibits precisely this degree of recipient design. There may not be co-present others, 
as there are for stories told in conversation, but the anticipation of potentially hostile 
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culturally based responses to a claim of an extraordinary coincidence, and recognition 
of the nature of the online site to which the account is being posted, resonate in the 
fabric of the account. 
 
 
Discussion 
In this paper we have outlined one empirical approach to the discursive phenomenon 
of meaningful coincidence, and sketched the lines of inquiry that may follow. We 
have adopted a broadly ethnomethodological focus to identify the tacit language 
norms and practices that inform the text and provide for its sense as a striking 
coincidence, and through which a particular range of inferential concerns can be 
managed.  There are other ways of analysing texts such as this one, but we are 
confident that this approach at least generates a range of tentative findings that 
warrant more sustained empirical inquiry of corpora of coincidence accounts. For 
example, the observations on the chiasmic structure of the account require further 
investigation of the extent to which this figurative form is a generic feature of 
coincidence accounts. Investigation of figurative forms in coincidence accounts more 
generally will contribute to the understanding of the poetic dimensions of everyday 
discourse. Some empirical findings are of course particular to this specific account; 
for example, the way that it has been designed to demonstrate awareness of the 
largely rational, statistical focus of the website to which it was submitted. But all 
accounts will be designed for the setting in which they are made public, be that 
everyday conversation, in a letter to a newspaper or in consultation with a therapist. 
Not all descriptions of coincidence will be designed in the way that we have said this 
account is designed, but they will be designed in some way.  
 27 
 
This has implications for these who wish to draw from coincidence experiences as a 
way of understanding and perhaps shaping the trajectory of the life course, or as a 
psychiatric resource to develop therapeutic strategies. It is clear in this literature that 
coincidences are treated as unproblematic ontological events – as if a coincidence was 
an objective thing in world that had core properties of a sufficiently fixed nature that 
an analyst can interpret their significance for the person reporting the coincidence. 
But the analysis has pointed to the many ways in which this coincidence account is 
produced to establish its character as a coincidence and, in various ways, to provide 
for its particular sense: as an account written for a particular public platform, for 
example. This suggests that what might be seen to be fixed properties of the account 
may be a feature of its production as a social, discursive object. This does not mean 
that it is not possible to use accounts of these experiences as therapeutic resources. 
However, the therapeutic focus may have to change. It may be that that the way the 
story is told provides richer and more suitable materials for therapeutic interpretation 
than what is reported.  
 
Accounts of meaningful coincidences reveal how human affairs may be interpreted as 
being subject to transcendent, spiritual or mystical interventions. Investigation of the 
way that the coincidental qualities of an experience are constituted through accounts 
may, therefore, provide insight to a range of other experiences in which human 
agency is taken to be matched, or even manipulated, by some other external agency. 
In the same way that Smith’s analysis of an account of mental illness revealed the 
tacit reasoning through which behaviours can be warrantably described as 
pathological, so too can analysis of coincidence accounts tell us about the tacit 
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communicative practices by which people negotiate the tension between their own 
individual agency and external influence in the life course. And this may inform our 
understanding of a range of spiritual and psychological phenomena, such as the 
believer’s assumption that they are realising a divine purpose, and the conviction 
exhibited by some people deemed to be mentally unwell that their thoughts are not 
their own. 
 
Finally: the case for the systematic study of the discourse of coincidence offers a 
counterpoint to research in psychology that treats the appearance of significant 
coincidence as merely the consequence of errors of interpretation and incorrect 
probabilistic reasoning or which investigates the cognitive processes by which people 
come to see events as meaningfully coincidental (Johanson and Osman, 2015; Rogers, 
Qualter and Wood, 2016). A common approach in this research is to categorise people 
into rather arbitrary and fixed categories: believer or non-believers, with high 
suggestibility or low suggestibility, either inclined to see the world as a mysterious 
place or not so inclined. These crude binary distinctions are often supported by quasi-
experimental research in which research participants are presented with artificial 
scenarios and asked to make probabilistic assessments that are then correlated with 
measures from other kinds of personality or belief scales. This conventional 
psychological approach seems curiously detached from the way that coincidences are 
actually reported. Analysis of coincidence claims will stand as a corrective to the 
more contrived approach currently in psychology. But more important, this kind of 
analysis may yield a more subtle understanding of the coincidence reporter. For 
example, it is clear that in describing her coincidence, the author of the target data is 
negotiating a tension between preserving the inherent mystery of the events at the 
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same time as exhibiting a recognition of the rational, perhaps sceptical, orientation of 
the website to which she is submitting the account. These normative and inferential 
tensions are handled in subtle ways in the detail of her descriptions. Crude personality 
classifications, such as believer or non-believer, do not capture the delicate 
management of competing interpretations of her experience. Analysing the discourse 
of coincidental events provides a more nuanced appreciation of the way that issues of 
belief or disbelief (and a range of other ostensibly psychological issues) are handled 
as a practical concern for reporters (Edwards and Potter, 2005), and emphasises the 
social dimension of coincidence accounts, and thereby, the social dimension of the 
phenomenon of meaningful coincidence.  
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Footnote 
1 Chiamus is related to antimetabole, another figurative device in which words, 
phrases or themes are reversed. However, so as not to over complicate our discussion, 
and with apologies to classical scholars, we will use chiasmus to refer generally to 
any instance of narrative reversal. 
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